In mechanism design, for a given type space, there may be incentive compatible mechanisms which are not affine maximizers. We prove that for two-player games on a discrete type space, any given mechanism can be turned into an affine maximizer through a nontrivial perturbation of the type space. Furthermore, our theorem is the strongest possible in this setup. Our proof relies on new results on the tropical determinant.
Introduction
Consider deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible (IC), quasi-linear mechanisms on m outcomes and n players. Affine maximizers form a special subset of IC mechanisms with desirable properties. Unfortunately, there are very few spaces where all IC mechanisms are affine maximizers. Since the first positive result of Roberts [17] , much efforts have been put in understanding and extending Roberts' theorem, often to rather specific type spaces [4, 8, 9, 12, 15, 19] , see [14] for a recent overview of this literature. Our paper takes a novel view on Roberts' theorem and its successors. Instead of looking for type spaces where all IC mechanisms are affine maximizers, we seek to quantify how large is the latter set relative to the former. In our setup, it is more natural to fix the set of IC outcome functions. Equivalently, the key question is: can a given mechanism be turned into an affine maximizer by perturbations of the type space that preserve the set of IC mechanisms as much as possible? Call this the perturbed Roberts' problem.
Type space perturbation has appeared in the context of robust mechanism design [2, 3, 5, 16 ]. Though the context is different, we share a common purpose with this literature, namely, to produce theorems in mechanism design which are largely detailed-free. In our case, a given type space imposes strong geometric constraints on the affine maximizers. Meanwhile, the set of IC mechanisms imposes combinatorial constraints. Specifically, our agents choose not to make public their individual type spaces, but the set of IC outcome functions instead. Without knowing the accompanying set of payment vectors, this does not pin down the type space, and thus is strictly less informative. However, it is still sufficient for the mechanism designer to verify if a give outcome function is IC. As we shall show in Section 2, revealing the set of IC outcomes on an individual type space is equivalent to revealing the agent's preference orders when only a subset of the type space and outcome is available, and therefore this is clearly a combinatorial constraint.
The answer to perturbed Roberts' problem depends on how strictly we adhere to the IC set constraints. For example, if we only require the set of IC mechanisms on the perturbed type space to contain the original, then one can trivially make all outcome functions affine maximizers: set the individual type spaces to contain exactly one point, where the agent is indifferent between all m outcomes. On the other hand, if we require that the set of IC mechanisms of the perturbed type spaces must be exactly equal to the original, then the result is negative (cf: Example 5.3). The strongest positive result we obtained for the perturbed Roberts' problem is the following. Theorem 1.1. Fix a finite type space T = T 1 × T 2 with n = 2 players and m ≥ 1 outcomes. Any deterministic IC outcome function g on T is an affine maximizer on another type space S = S 1 × S 2 , where the set of IC mechanisms on S 1 exactly equals the set of IC mechanisms on T 1 .
In Theorem 1.1, S 1 is a nontrivial perturbation of T 1 as it has to satisfy the same set of equalities and inequalities as T 1 . More specifically, suppose that the announcement of player two is fixed, and consider a single player game in the first player. Let r 1 be the cardinality of T 1 , and for an integer k, let [k] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. An outcome function of this single-player game is a vector in [m] r 1 , where the k-th coordinate is the outcome when the player declares type t 1,k ∈ T 1 , k ∈ [r 1 ]. Except when all points in T 1 are identical, the set of IC outcomes on T 1 is a proper subset of [m] r 1 . The theorem guarantees that the new type space S 1 will have exactly the same such set. This stops S 1 to be the trivial set where all points are equal, for example. Furthermore, the given outcome function g is determined by T , so g being an affine maximizer on S means S 2 must satisfy some of the inequalities and equalities as those satisfied by T 2 . Thus the set S 2 cannot be trivial neither.
Somewhat surprisingly, without further constraints on g, Theorem 1.1 is the strongest possible in the framework. Through a series of counter examples, we show that various stronger versions of this theorem are all false. In particular, the theorem is false for n = 3 (cf: Example 5.2). It is also false if one requires that in addition, the set of all IC mechanisms on S 2 must also equals the set of IC mechanisms on T 2 (cf: Example 5.3), or that it must holds for two outcome functions g, h simultaneously (cf: Example 5.6).
Our second major result explores neutral outcome functions in two-player games with identical type spaces, that is, T 1 = T 2 and g is symmetric. In this case, Theorem 4.2 states that one can obtain a nontrivial perturbation S 1 such that g is an affine maximizer on S 1 ×S 1 . This theorem does not strengthen Theorem 1.1, since the set of IC mechanisms on S 1 may not equal to that on T 1 . Indeed, if one adds this requirement to the statement of Theorem 1.1, then it is no longer true for all g. Therefore, Theorem 1.1 still cannot be strengthened even in this case.
In addition to a novel view on Roberts' theorem, our proof uses and develops new results from tropical convex geometry, which have featured in a number of economic papers [1, 10, 18] , including mechanism design [6] . In particular, we give a bijection between generators for permutations that appear in the tropical determinant and cyclic equalities forced upon the type space by a given outcome function. This result is of independent interest in both tropical linear algebra and mechanism design. In this paper, it plays a crucial role in establishing the equality between the set of IC outcome functions in S 1 and T 1 in Theorem 1.1.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the connections between tropical geometry and mechanism design. In Section 3, we refine these results using tropical determinants. In Section 4, we prove the main results. Section 5 contains various examples, as well as counter examples to stronger statements of the theorems. Finally, we conclude with open questions in Section 6.
Background
This section contains a brief introduction to mechanism design, and the tropical geometric view on the topic, first investigated in [6] . For a comprehensive introduction to each of these topics individually, see [19] for mechanism design and [13] for tropical geometry.
Consider a game with m ∈ N outcomes, n ∈ N players with finite type space T = T 1 ×· · ·× T n , |T i | = r i for i ∈ [n]. We shall identify T with an m × r 1 × · · · × r n tensor. For example, for single player games, a matrix M ∈ R r×m defines a type space with cardinality r on a single player game with m outcomes, where the r row of M are the r type vectors in R m . A deterministic mechanism with quasi-linear utility consists of an outcome function g : T → [m] and a payment function p : T → R n . If the players declare a type s ∈ T to the mechanism, the game outcome is g(s) and the players are required to pay p(s). If player i has true type t, her utility from a particular outcome k ∈ [m] is t k minus what he needs to pay. Players are assumed to declare a type that maximizes their utility, which may not be their true types. A mechanism (g, p) is incentive compatible for player i if regardless of what the other players declare, player i does best by declaring her true type. A mechanism (g, p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible (IC) if it is incentive compatible for all players. An outcome function g is called an affine maximizer on T if there exists weights α 1 , . . . , α n > 0, a constant vector β ∈ R m , and a single-player IC outcome function h :
such that g(t 1 , . . . , t n ) = h(α 1 t 1 + · · · + α n t n + β). For type space T = T 1 × · · · × T n , let IC(T 1 , . . . , T n ) denotes its set of all IC mechanisms, and AM(T 1 , . . . , T n ) its set of all affine maximizers. The following are immediate from the definitions. For a single player type space M ∈ R r×m and an outcome function g ∈ IC(M), let P (h) ⊆ R m denote its set of incentive compatible payments. This is the set of x ∈ R m such that
The following is a classical result in mechanism design, see [19, §4] .
Now let us recall the tropical view of mechanism design explored in [6] . The min-plus tropical algebra (R ∪{∞}, ⊕, ⊙) is defined by a⊕b = min(a, b) a⊙b = a+b for a, b ∈ R ∪{∞}. The min-plus determinant of a k × k matrix M is the usual determinant with arithmetic carried out in (R ∪{∞}, ⊙, ⊕), that is
If the minimum in (2) is attained at least twice, say that the tropical determinant of M is singular. Say that a matrix M ∈ R r×m is tropically generic if for all 2 ≤ k ≤ min(r, m), no k × k minor of M has singular tropical determinant. Otherwise, say that M is tropically singular. Many classic facts in convex geometry have tropical analogues. For instance, M is tropically generic if and only if the r tropical hyperplanes defined by the r columns of M intersect 'generically', that is, no k points in this hyperplane arrangement lie in a k-dimensional tropical hyperplane. Let H(−M) denotes this tropical hyperplane arrangement, the minus follows the sign convention in [6] . Like in classical geometry, H(−M) subdivides R m into regions called cells. Each cell of H(−M) corresponds to the set of IC payments for a particular IC outcome function [6, Theorem 1] . This gives a way to visualize and enumerate the set of IC outcome functions and their payment sets, as seen in the example below. 
When a = b, we can always fix other x k and let x a be sufficiently small, hence (a, a) always belongs to IC(M). When a = b, we get
The system (3) is feasible if and only if
Therefore, any (a, b) ∈ [3] 2 that satisfies (4) is in IC(M). This gives IC(M) = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3)}.
Note that (4) is closely related to the tropical determinant of the 2 × 2 minor of M formed by its two rows and the column columns a, b ∈ [3] , which is
In this case, the minimum is always achieved by one of the terms, so all 2 × 2 minor of M are not singular. Therefore, M is generic We can visualize the elements of IC(M) in the Euclidean plane, see Figure 1 . Note that adding a vector (c, c, c) to a row vector of M does not change IC(M), we may assume that the first column of M is the zero vector. For each row vector (0, p, q) (p, q ∈ R), we consider the standard tropical line centered at (x, y), which consists of three rays: x = p, y ≥ q; y = q, x ≥ p; x − p = y − q ≤ 0. These rays divide the plane into three closed cells that overlap in the rays. We label them by 1, 2, 3 such that for a point z in the i-th region, the minimum of (0 − 0, z 1 − p, z 2 − q) is attained at the i-th number. if and only if the all the minima are attained only once, if and only if the strict inequalities in (10) hold. Figure 1 shows the cell types in IC(M).
While [6] emphasized the geometry of the tropical hyperplane arrangement and its connections to outcome functions, in this paper, we take the more algebraic view. Theorem 2.5 below gives an algebraic criterion for when IC(S) = IC(T ). This result is equivalent to the main theorem of [7] , and can be seen as a particular application of the Gröbner bases approach to integer programming. Most importantly, it lends an interpretation to the constraints imposed upon a type space by its set of IC outcome functions. 
This gives two possible M-weight (I, O)-circuits:
and the negative of this equation. Since the payment function only depends on the set of outcomes, which is {3, 4} in both cases, the above equation expresses the difference in the player's total utility when her type is either 1 or 2, and the outcome must be either 3 or 4. A maximal M-weight (I, O)-circuit thus corresponds to an outcome function that maximizes utility for the player should the set of outcomes be restricted to O and the type space be restricted to I. Now suppose that the agent does not tell the mechanism designer her type space, but instead only gives out the set of all IC outcome functions on it. Theorem 2.5 states this is equivalent to her revealing all the maximal (I, O) circuits on her type space.
We recall one last auxiliary result. The existence of type spaces with desired properties reduces to feasibility of particular linear systems of inequalities. Our main technique for working with such feasibility problems is the Fourier-Motzkin method [20] . It works by eliminating variables, and should the system be infeasible, one should obtain a contradiction of the form 0 < 0. When used to produce an infeasibility certificate, the Fourier-Motzkin is a refinement of Farkas' lemma in linear programming. Definition 2.6. A circuit of a homogeneous linear system is an N-linear combinations of the inequalities and equalities in this system such that all the variables cancel.
Then the system is infeasible if and only if there exists a circuit that involves at least one strict inequality of the form j c i ′′ j x j < 0.
Tropical determinant, outcome functions and type spaces
This section contains new results that link the three objects in the title. In particular, Proposition 3.5 plays a crucial role in the proof of the main theorems. First, we give a refinement of Corollary 2.2. Lemma 3.1 below records which inequalities in (1) must be equalities, based on the tropical determinant of M. 
. For each such k × k minor, let Σ ζ be the set of permutations that achieve the minimum in the tropical determinant of this minor, as defined in (2) . Then the relative interior of P (h) is the set of x ∈ R m that satisfies
where (5) Proof. Since h ∈ IC(M), P (h) given by (1) is non-empty. To establish the claim, it is sufficient to argue which of these equations cannot be a strict inequality. Consider the case where all the h(i)'s are equal. Then trivially all inequalities in (1) can be set to a strict inequality by making the appropriate coordinate of x arbitrarily small, so the relative interior of P (h) is given by (6) . As defined, there are no equations in (5) , so the claim holds. Now suppose the h(i)'s are not all equal. Fix a k × k minor ζ with indices (i 1 , . . . , i k ) × (h(i 1 ), . . . , h(i k )). By definition of the tropical determinant, the identity permutation is always in Σ ζ . For any other permutation σ ′ ∈ Σ ζ , we have (7) x
. Summing over all ℓ, as σ ′ is a permutation, the x-variables cancel, and one obtains
But the LHS equals the tropical determinant of ζ, and σ ′ ∈ Σ ζ , so one must have an equality.
Since P (h) = ∅, none of the inequalities in (7) can be strict, so they must all be equal. By rewriting this as a pairwise equality between permutations in Σ ζ , we obtain (5) . Now we argue that there can be no more equalities, by showing that the system (5) and (6) is feasible. Suppose for contradiction that it is not. By Lemma 2.7, there exists a circuit in the system (5) and (6) with at least one strict inequality in (6) . In particular, the LHS of this circuit defines a multigraph on [m] × [r] with edges (i, h(i)), while the RHS defines another multigraph with edges (i, ℓ) for some appropriately chosen set of indices ℓ ∈ [m].
Since the x-variables on the two sides cancel, these two graphs have equal degree sequences. Therefore, they can be written as a sum of pairs of permutations on various minors of M.
Since h ∈ IC(M), on each of this minor, the LHS must attain the tropical determinant. By the equality assumption, the RHS must also attain the tropical determinant on each of these minor. Therefore, both the LHS and RHS are linear combination of the equations in (5), and thus there are no strict inequality (6) in the sum, a contradiction. 
We now consider the constraints imposed upon a matrix M by the requirement that IC(M) must contains some particular set of elements. This can be seen as a converse of Lemma 3.1. In particular, we focus on maximally generic matrices, that is, matrices with fewest number of singular minors amongst those that satisfy the given constraints. For notational convenience, we list these constrained elements of IC(M) as column vectors in a matrix. 
The above is an immediate consequence of Corollary 2.2. Parallel to the generalization of Corollary 2.2 to Lemma 3.1, our goal is to refine this result by spelling out which inequalities in (9) must be equalities.
In particular, for all circuits in (9) , set all the inequalities involved to be an equality. For the remaining inequalities, set them to be strict inequalities. Let E(V ) ⊂ [r] × [q] × [m] be the indices for the equations, and E c (V ) ⊂ [r] × [q] × [m] be the remaining indices. Call the following system in variables X and U the strict linear system of V
and call the following system in variables X and U the linear system of V Proof. By construction, the linear system of V is equivalent to (9) . Therefore, it is feasible, and (X, M) is a solution if and only if V belongs to type M, by Corollary 3.4. Also by construction, the strict linear system has no circuits, and thus it is also feasible by Lemma 2.7. So we have established (i) and (ii). For the third statement, associate to each v ∈ [q] two bipartite graphs on [r] × [m]: the left graph consists of edges (i, V i,v ) , and the right graph consists of edges (i, k), for all (i, v, k) ∈ E(V ). These graphs have the same out degree sequence and the same number of edges, therefore their M-weight difference can be decomposed as a union of (I, O) circuits. Each circuit defines a minor of M, and the two cyclic shifts involved are two different permutations that achieve the tropical determinant. Therefore, each circuit defines a tropically singular minor of M, which proves (iii). For (iv), suppose (X, M) is a solution to the strict linear system. Consider any tropically singular minor of M. By the same argument as done in Lemma 3.1, this minor must induce an inequality of the form 0 ≤ 0 obtained by positive integer combinations of the inequalities in (9) . However, if one of these inequalities is in E c (V ), then one would get a contradiction of the form 0 < 0. Thus they all must lie in E(V ). Therefore, all tropically singular minors of M are determined by E(V ).
In other words, solutions to the strict linear system of V are the maximally generic matrices under the constraint that it must contain V in its type. If E(V ) = ∅, say that V is cyclefree. Combined with [6, Corollary 1.2], we obtain a characterization for the type matrices of tropically generic type spaces. For n = 2, a given g ∈ [m] r 1 ×r 2 may belong to type M for some M ∈ R r 1 ×m , or that its transpose may belong to type M ′ for some M ′ ∈ R r 2 ×m . The following shows that g imposes the same singularity constraints on M as that on M ′ . This special relation only holds for two players, and explains why our results only hold for this case. Proof. The strict linear system of g is
and the strict linear system of g ⊤ is
By substituting X 2 with X 1 and U 2 with U 1 , one sees that there is a one-to-one correspondence between equations in (12) and (13) . Since both systems are feasible and have the maximal number of equalities possible, this induces a bijection between E(g) and E(g ⊤ ).
Finally, we consider the constraint imposes upon a pair of matrices S 1 ∈ R r 1 ×m , S 2 ∈ R r 2 ×m when one requires that AM(S 1 , S 2 ) must contains a particular element. For fixed S 1 , S 2 , this constraint also depends on the variables α 1 , α 2 . When one proves existence of such S 1 , S 2 , however, one is making a statement about the set of all S 1 , S 2 such that g ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 ), and thus can disregard α 1 , α 2 . This result generalizes readily to three or more players.
if and only if the following system in the variables Z, U 1 , U 2 is feasible
If the previous system is feasible, then a solution pair U 1 , U 2 is maximally generic if and only if
Proof. By definition of affine maximizers and Lemma 2.2, g is an affine maximizer with respect to some two-player type space if and only if the following system in variables Z, U 1 , U 2 is feasible:
Note that the constants α 1 , α 2 do not feature in this system, since U 1 and U 2 are variables. In particular, if g ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 ) for some fixed S 1 , S 2 with coefficients α 1 , α 2 > 0, then U 1 := α 1 S 1 , U 2 := α 2 S 2 must be a solution to (18) . Now, for (i, j, k) ∈ E(g), the system in variables Y, U 1 is feasible only if
Therefore for (18) to be feasible, one must have an equality for all (i, j, k) ∈ E(g). By the same argument, one must also have an equality for all (j, i, k) ∈ E(g ⊤ ). By Lemma 3.8, this does not had further constraints. Therefore, g ∈ AM(U 1 , U 2 ) if and only if (14) and (15) hold. The last statement follows from applying Proposition 3.5 twice: with V = g, U = U 1 , X = Z − U 2 in the first case, and V = g, U = U 2 , X = Z − U 1 in the second case. In the first case, Proposition 3.5 proves maximal genericity for U 1 . In the second case, it proves maximal genericity for U 2 .
Definition 3.10. For type spaces T 1 , . . . , T n with T j ∈ R r j ×m , we define their tensor sum as a matrix C(T 1 , . . . , T n ) ∈ R ( n j=1 r j ) ×m such that for i = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) ∈ [r 1 ] × [r 2 ] × · · · × [r n ] and 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
Remark 3.11. For type spaces T 1 , . . . , T n with T j ∈ R r j ×m and a matrix g ∈ [m] r 1 ×···×rn , by Lemma 3.9, g ∈ AM(T 1 , . . . , T n ) if and only if there exist α ∈ R n >0 such that as a vector with n j=1 r j entries, g belongs to IC(C(α 1 T 1 , . . . , α n T n )).
Proof of the main results
We will now prove Theorem 4.1 below, a result that clearly implies Theorem 1.1. The proof involves setting up two systems of inequalities: one that is feasible if and only if the hypothesis holds, and one that is feasible if and only if the conclusion holds. A delicate point is that the exact inequalities depend on E(g). This is precisely where we make use of the lemmas in the previous section. Without the concept of tropically generic and singular, this result would be difficult to prove.
, then there exist matrices S 1 ∈ R r 1 ×m , S 2 ∈ R r 2 ×m such that g ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 ) and IC(T 1 ) = IC(S 1 ).
Proof. Consider matrices U 1 , X 2 ∈ R r 1 ×m and U 2 , X 1 ∈ R r 2 ×m and vector Z ∈ R m . Let V be a type matrix of T 1 . Consider the following family of inequalities in variables X 1 , U 1 , X 2 , U 2 :
By Proposition 3.5, the equations (u1a) and (u1b) say that IC(U 1 ) contains the columns of g. The equations (u2a) and (u2b) say that IC(U 2 ) contains the rows of g. Thus these four equations say that g ∈ IC(U 1 , U 2 ). The equations (u12a) and (u12b) say that IC(U 1 ) = IC(T 1 ). The claim is that if the system (19) is feasible, then the system (20) in variables X 1 , U 1 , U 2 , Z is also feasible:
The equations (u12a) and (u12b) in (20) say that IC(U 1 ) = IC(T 1 ). By Lemma 3.9, equations (za) and (zb) say that g ∈ AM(U 1 , U 2 ), and U 1 and U 2 are maximally generic. Note that (u1a) and (u1b) in (19) has a one-to-one correspondence with (za) and (zb) in (20) , seen by substituting X 1 a,b for Z b −U 2 a,b . Now, suppose for contradiction that the second system is not feasible. Then, there is a circuit obtained by summing n 2 inequalities of the Z-entries , and n 1 inequalities of the X-entries, counting multiplicity. Then we have a finite list of indices (i p , j p , k p ) (1 ≤ p ≤ n 2 ) and (i q , v q , k q ) (1 ≤ q ≤ n 1 ), such that the sum is
As (21) is a circuit, it must sum to zero. In particular, this implies that the Z-sum cancels and the U 1 -sum cancels. Therefore, the X-sum in (22) must also cancel, so the new equation is still zero. But this new equation is a circuit of the system (20) , therefore they are also infeasible. This is the desired contradiction. Now consider a two-player game with identical individual type spaces, that is, T 1 = T 2 . One can require that in addition the outcome function is neutral, that is, g is symmetric. Theorem 1.1 implies that one can choose type spaces S 1 , S 2 such that g ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 ). One may ask if one can further require S 1 = S 2 . The answer is affirmative, however, one must drop the assumption that IC(S 1 ) = IC(T 1 ). Theorem 4.2. Fix T ∈ R r×m . Suppose g is symmetric and g ∈ IC(T, T ). There exists S ∈ R r×m such that g ∈ AM(S, S) and S is maximally generic with respect to this constraint.
Proof. Since g is symmetric, the rows of g and the columns of g form the same multiset. By Proposition 3.5, the strict linear system of g defined by the equations in (10) is feasible. By Lemma 3.9, g is an affine maximizer for some two-player game with identical, maximally generic types if and only if the following system in variables Z, S is feasible
Suppose for contradiction that there does not exist such an S, so (23) is not feasible. By Lemma 2.7, there exists a circuit with at least one strict inequality. In other words, there exist finitely many triples of indices (i p , j p , k p ), (1 ≤ p ≤ n) such that n p=1 Z kp − S ip,kp − S jp,kp − Z g ip,jp − S ip,g ip,jp − S jp,g ip,jp = 0.
In particular (24) n p=1 S ip,g ip,jp + S jp,g ip,jp − S ip,kp − S jp,kp = 0. Now in (10), we set V = g and plug-in i = i p , v = j p , k = k p and i = j p , v = i p , k = k p for p = 1, 2 · · · , n. As g is symmetric, we have
There must be at least one triple (i p , j p , k p ) ∈ E c (g). Thus, summing over these inequalities, we get a strict inequality n p=1 X ip,kp + X jp,kp − X ip,g ip,jp + X jp,g ip,jp − n p=1 U ip,kp + U jp,kp − U ip,g ip,jp + U jp,g ip,jp > 0.
(29) By (24), the latter term in LHS of (29) is identically zero, hence so is the first term in LHS of (29), because all indices appear the same number of times and coefficients in the two terms. Then (29) is not feasible, nor is (10) , which is the desired contradiction.
Examples and counter examples
In this section, we present positive examples that illustrate Theorem 1.1 (Example 5.1) and Theorem 4.2 (Example 5.4). Unfortunately, many generalizations of these theorems are not true. Examples 5.2, 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6 show that they cannot be strengthened in several ways. The columns and rows belong to IC(T 1 ), IC(T 2 ), respectively, as shown in Figure 2 . So g ∈ IC(T 1 , T 2 ). But we claim that g / ∈ AM(T 1 , T 2 ). Suppose there exist α 1 , α 2 > 0 such that g ∈ IC(C(α 1 T 1 , α 2 T 2 )). Then there exists z ∈ R 3 such that for 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ 3 and k = g i,j ,
So we have z 2 − z 1 ≤ 2α 1 + 5α 2 (i = 1, j = 1, g i,j = 2, k = 1); (30)
But 3(30) + (31) + 2(32) + (33) gives 0 ≤ −α 1 , a contradiction! So g / ∈ AM(T 1 , T 2 ). However, there exists another matrix S 2 such that g ∈ AM(T 1 , S 2 ) (in this example we can take S 1 = T 1 ): Figure 2 visualizes the five relevant tropical hyperplane arrangements: T 1 , T 2 , S 2 , and the tensor sums C = C(T 1 , T 2 ), C ′ = C(T 1 , S 2 ). All of these arrangements are generic. Despite S 2 and T 2 only differ by two entries, their cell types are different. The last picture illustrates that g ∈ AM(T 1 , S 2 ). The second last picture shows that g / ∈ AM(T 1 , T 2 ) with constants α 1 = α 2 = 1. This picture does not prove that g / ∈ AM(T 1 , T 2 ) (for in theory, one could vary α), but our calculation shows that no such α is possible.
Example 5.2 (Counterexample of Theorem 1.1 with 3 players). This counterexample demonstrates that the analogue of Theorem 4.1 does not hold for n = 3, and therefore Theorem 1.1 also fails for n = 3. Let r 1 = r 2 = r 3 = 2 and m = 6. We claim that there exists a 2 × 2 × 2 tensor g such that there exist T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ∈ R 2×6 with g ∈ IC(T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ), but for any S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ∈ R 2×6 , g ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) and IC(T 1 ) = IC(S 1 ) cannot happen simultaneously.
We let g 1,1,1 = 1, g 1,1,2 = 3, g 1,2,1 = 4, g 1,2,2 = 1, g 2,1,1 = 5, g 2,1,2 = 2, g 2,2,1 = 2, g 2,2,2 = 6.
The following matrices T 1 , T 2 , T 3 satisfy that g ∈ IC(T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ). The reason is that the column vectors of corresponding flattenings of g belong to IC(T i ), where i = 1, 2, 3:
The cell type (211212333) / ∈ IC(C), as the region 1 of C 2 is disjoint from the region 3 of C 7 .
The cell type (211212333) ∈ IC(C ′ ). (1, 5), (3, 2) , (4, 2) , (1, 6) ∈ IC(T 1 );
(1, 3), (4, 1), (5, 2) , (2, 6) ∈ IC(T 1 ); (1, 4) , (3, 1) , (5, 2) , (2, 6) ∈ IC(T 1 ).
Suppose g is the affine maximizer of some three-player game. By Lemma 3.9, this holds if and oly if the following system of linear inequalities in variables Z, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 is feasible:
Here in (35) the Z entries are all variables, and the S entries are all constants. Then we have
Summing over the 4 inequalities in (36), we get
However, note that (2, 1) ∈ IC(T 1 ) = IC(S 1 ), which means that there exist x 1 , x 2 ∈ R such that We have that IC(T 1 ) = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2) , (2, 4) , (3, 1) , (3, 2) , (3, 3) , (3, 4) , (4, 1), (4, 4)} IC(T 2 ) = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 1), (3, 2) , (3, 3) , (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4)}, so g ∈ IC(T 1 , T 2 ). However, there do not exist matrices S 1 , S 2 such that g ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 ) and IC(S 1 ) = IC(T 1 ), IC(S 2 ) = IC(T 2 ), and therefore Theorem 4.1 cannot holds with IC(S 2 ) = IC(T 2 ). Indeed, suppose for contradiction that such S 1 and S 2 exist. Since IC(S 1 ) = IC(αS 1 ) for all positive α > 0, one may assume that the constants α 1 , α 2 in the affine maximizer equal to one. Since (2, 4) ∈ IC(T 1 ), we have (2, 4) ∈ IC(S 1 ); since (3, 1) ∈ IC(T 2 ), we have (3, 1) ∈ IC(S 2 ). In addition, since both T 1 , T 2 are tropically generic, so are S 1 , S 2 . Then there exists x, y ∈ R 4 such that
In addition, since g ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 ) with constants α 1 = α 2 = 1, we can find z ∈ R 4 such that
Summing over all inequalities (37) and (38), we have 0 < 0, a contradiction. Example 5.5. This example shows that Theorem 4.2 is no longer true if we require in addition that IC(S) = IC(T ). Let T, g be the same as in Example 5.4. Then IC(T ) = {(1, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 2), (2, 2, 2), (2, 3, 2), (3, 1, 1), (3, 1, 2), (3, 3, 1), (3, 3, 2), (3, 3, 3)}, therefore g ∈ IC(T, T ). However, there is no 3 × 3 matrix S such that g ∈ AM(S, S) and IC(S) = IC(T ). Indeed, suppose for contradiction that such S exists. Similar to Example 5.3, one may assume that α 1 = α 2 = 1. Since T is tropically generic, so is S. In addition, (3, 1, 2) ∈ IC(T ) = IC(S) (this cell type (3, 1, 2) corresponds to the unique close cell in the left picture of Figure 3 ). So there exist y, z ∈ R 3 such that
and since g ∈ AM(S, S) with constants α 1 = α 2 = 1,
So we have the following inequalities
Summing over the inequalities in (41), we obtain the desired contradiction.
Example 5.6. This example shows that in Theorem 4.1, we cannot expect to have the same S 1 , S 2 for a family of different matrices g ∈ IC(T 1 , T 2 ). Let m = 3, n = 2 and r 1 = r 2 = 2. Define T 1 = 0 1 3 0 2 1 , T 2 = 0 4 2 0 2 0 , g 1 = 2 3 2 1 , g 2 = 3 1 3 2 .
Note that T 1 is the matrix M 1 in Example 2.3, and T 2 is not tropically generic because the 2 × 2 minor formed by the second and the third columns is tropically singular. We have IC(T 1 ) = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3)} IC(T 2 ) = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3)}. Therefore, g 1 , g 2 ∈ IC(T 1 , T 2 ). We claim that there exist no S 1 , S 2 ∈ R 2×3 such that (1) g 1 , g 2 ∈ AM(S 1 , S 2 ), and (2) IC(S 1 ) = IC(T 1 ). Suppose such S 1 , S 2 exist. By definition, there exists positive constants α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 such that g 1 ∈ IC(C(α 1 S 1 , α 2 S 2 )) and g 2 ∈ IC(C(β 1 S 1 , β 2 S 2 )). Then there exist y, z ∈ R 3 such that for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, 1 ≤ p ≤ 3,
Hence we have the following inequalities:
and
(i = 1, j = 2, g 2 i,j = 1, p = 3); (43)
(i = j = 2, g 2 i,j = 2, p = 1); (45)
(i = j = 2, g 2 i,j = 2, p = 3).
Summing over the inequalities in (42), we get (47) α 1 · S 1 1,2 + S 1 2,1 − S 1 1,1 − S 1 2,2 + α 2 · S 2 1,2 + S 2 2,3 − S 2 1,3 − S 2 2,1 ≥ 0. In addition, (43)+(44)+(45) we get (48) β 1 · S 1 1,1 + S 1 2,3 − S 1 1,3 − S 1 2,1 + β 2 · S 2 1,3 + S 2 2,2 − S 2 1,2 − S 2 2,3 ≥ 0. And (44)+(46) we get (since β 2 > 0, we can divide by it) (49) S 2 1,3 + S 2 2,2 − S 2 1,2 − S 2 2,3 ≥ 0. Note that IC(S 1 ) = IC(T 1 ) and T 1 is tropically generic, so is S 1 . Then (1, 2), (3, 2) ∈ IC(S 1 ) and thus (50) S 1 1,1 + S 1 2,2 − S 1 1,2 − S 1 2,1 > 0 and (51) S 1 1,3 + S 1 2,2 − S 1 1,2 − S 1 2,3 > 0. Now if α 1 β 2 ≥ α 2 β 1 , then we take the sum α 2 β 1 · (51) + (α 1 β 2 − α 2 β 1 ) · (50) + β 2 · (47) + α 2 · (48), which is a R ≥0 -linear combination of these inequalities, and its LHS vanishes. Since (51) is a strict inequality and α 2 β 1 > 0, it gives 0 > 0, a contradiction! Similarly, if α 1 β 2 < α 2 β 1 , then we take the sum α 1 β 1 · (51) + (α 2 β 1 − α 1 β 2 ) · (49) + β 1 · (47) + α 1 · (48), which is a R + -linear combination of these inequalities, and its LHS vanishes too. Since (51) is a strict inequality and α 1 β 1 > 0, it gives 0 > 0, a contradiction, too! So in either case there is a contradiction, and such a pair of S 1 , S 2 does not exist.
Summary
In this paper, we take a novel view of the classical Roberts' theorem and ask if a given mechanism can be turned into an affine maximizer on an equivalent type space. We give two affirmative results in this direction, Theorems 1.1 and 4.2, which apply to all finite type spaces on two-player games. Through a series of counterexamples, we show that our theorems are strongest possible in this general setup. Our proof technique utilizes insights from tropical geometry, and raises a number of questions of interest to both economists and tropical geometers.
The first main open question is whether Theorem 4.2 holds for more than two players. That is, can all symmetric, neutral outcome functions on a finite type space in any dimension be realized as an affine maximizer in some other finite type spaces, taken to be as generic as possible? From the viewpoint of economics, this can be seen as a measure of 'richness' for the class of affine maximizers. Through our proof technique, the problem is equivalent to whether a particular system of linear inequalities similar to (23) is feasible, given that a system similar to (10) is feasible. To prove the affirmative, one needs to construct a global circuit of the second system from one in the first. To prove the negative, one needs to construct a global circuit in the first system. The number of inequalities one needs to consider grows with both n and m, and thus explicit constructions are difficult. Through exhaustive computations we can confirm that this result holds for three players with three outcomes. However, the global circuits are closely related to the problem of determining whether a matrix is tropically singular, which is NP-Complete [11] . Therefore, numerical verification of the open problem quickly becomes prohibitive.
The second open question is whether our theorems hold for continuous type spaces. Continuous type spaces frequently feature in the classical setup of Roberts' theorem. Furthermore, for type spaces such as R n , the set of IC mechanisms completely determines the type space. Should Theorem 1.1 holds in such setup, then it would give an alternative proof of Roberts' theorem, as IC(S 1 ) = IC(T 1 ) would then imply that S 1 = T 1 , which means any IC mechanism can be made into an affine maximizer. While compact type spaces can be approximated by discretization, and a number of tropical geometric results still hold in the limit [6] , the dimensions of the matrices involved become infinite. In particular, one then has an infinite system of inequalities and variables, and thus the techniques applied in our paper no longer hold.
